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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to a transfer from the Utah Supreme Court, 
in accordance with Section 78-2-3 (4), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended). The Supreme Court of Utah has 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 78-2-
2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in applying the doctrine 
of zoning estoppel? This issue presents a question of law 
and the trial court7s decision will be reviewed for 
correctness. Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678 (Utah 
1997). This issue was preserved in the City's Reply Brief 
in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and in its 
closing argument where objection was made to consideration 
of the issue of estoppel. See R. at 7, 14, 203; Transcript 
of Trial at p. 183. 
2. Did the trial court err in finding that the City 
is estopped from applying its zoning regulations to Hugoes' 
use of their property? This issue presents a mixed question 
-1-
of fact and law and the trial court's decision will be 
reviewed to determine if the trial court abused its 
discretion. Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 
1980). This issue was preserved in the City' Reply Brief in 
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and in its 
closing argument where objection was made to consideration 
of the issue of estoppel. See R. at 7, 14, 203; Transcript 
of Trial at p. 183. 
3. Did the trial court err in concluding that Hugoes' 
use of their property was permitted under the former Woods 
Cross City Zoning Ordinance? This issue presents a question 
of law and the trial court's decision will be reviewed for 
correctness. Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797 
(Utah App. 1992). This issue was preserved for appeal in 
the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and in the City's 
closing argument. See R. at 91, Transcript of Trial at p. 
183. 
4. Did the trial court err in concluding that Hugoes 
have a legal right to nonconforming use as a "transfer 
company"? This issue presents a question of law and the 
Court will review the trial court's decision for 
-2-
correctness. Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797 
(Utah App. 1992). This issue was preserved for appeal in 
the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and in the City's 
closing argument. See R. at 91, Transcript of Trial at p. 
183. 
A. Is the Hugoes' use of their property 
consistent with the prior uses maintained on the 
property? This issue presents a question of law and 
the Court will review the trial court's decision for 
correctness. Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 
797 (Utah App. 1992). This issue was preserved for 
appeal in the City's closing argument. See Transcript 
of Trial at p. 177# et. seq.. 
B. Were the Site Plan Regulations of the former 
City Zoning Ordinance applicable to Hugoes' use of the 
property? This issue presents a question of law and 
the Court will review the trial court's decision for 
correctness. Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 
797 (Utah App. 1992). This issue was preserved for 
appeal in the City's closing argument. See Transcript 
of Trial at p. 177/ et. seq. 
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5. Do the Hugoes have a vested right to use their 
property to park their trucks as a result of the fill permit 
issued by the City? This issue presents a question of law 
and the Court will review the trial court's decision for 
correctness. Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 
(Utah 1997). This issue was preserved for appeal in the 
City's closing argument. See Transcript of Trial at p. 177, 
et. seq. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes and ordinances are determinative 
of this appeal: 
Section 10-9-103 (1) (k), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended): 
(k) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that: 
(i) legally existed before its current 
zoning designation; 
(ii) has been maintained continuously 
since the time the zoning regulation 
governing the land changed; and 
(iii) because of subsequent zoning 
changes, does not conform with the zoning 
regulations that now govern the land. 
Former Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance Section 11-18-9: 
-4-
SITE PLAN, In any commercial or manufacturing zone, 
and in all zones where construction of main 
buildings or dwellings other than single-family 
dwellings is proposed or involved, the location of 
main and accessory buildings on the site and in 
relation to one another, the traffic circulation 
features within the site, the height and bulk of 
buildings, the provision for off-street parking 
space, the provision for driveways for ingress and 
egress, and for the installation of curb, gutter 
and/or sidewalk when not already in place along the 
street bordering, and provision for other open space 
on the site, and the display of signs shall be in 
accordance with a site plan or plans or subsequent 
amendment thereof, approved in any case by the 
Planning Commission prior to issuance of a Building 
or Land-Use Permit• In approving site plans the 
Planning Commission may act on a site plan submitted 
to it or may act on its own initiative in proposing 
and approving a site plan, including any conditions 
or requirements designated or specified on or in 
connection therewith. A site plan shall include 
landscaping, fences, and walls designed to further 
the purposes of the regulations for commercial, 
industrial, and residential zones with two or more 
family dwelling units and such features shall be 
provided and maintained as a condition of the 
establishment and maintenance of any use to which 
they are appurtenant. In considering any site plan 
hereunder the Planning Commission shall endeavor to 
assure safety and convenience of traffic movements 
both within the area covered and in relation to 
access streets, harmonious and beneficial relation 
among the buildings and uses in the area covered, 
and satisfactory and harmonious relation between 
such area and contiguous land and buildings and 
adjacent neighborhoods. 
All persons required to file a site plan under the 
provisions of this Section shall, at the time of the 
filing thereof, pay to the City a fee of $10.00 per 
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acre, or any portion thereof, contained within the 
area covered by the site plan, with a minimum fee of 
$25.00, the same to cover part of the cost of 
processing and reviewing said site plan; provided, 
however, that said fee may be changed from time to 
time by Resolution of the City Council. 
Former Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance Title 11, Chapter 
13. 
This Chapter is set out in its entirety in the Appendix 
to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was originally brought by the 
Plaintiffs Damon and Debbie Hugoe and Hugoe Trucking as an 
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Hugoes 
sought to prevent Woods Cross City from enforcing its zoning 
ordinances to preclude the Hugoes' use of their property to 
park trucks from their business, Hugoe Trucking. Cross 
Motions for Summary Judgment were filed and were denied. 
The matter proceeded to trial, on the merits, on 
February 12, 1997, in the Second Judicial District Court, 
Farmington Department, in Davis County, State of Utah. The 
Honorable Rodney S. Page heard the evidence and issued a 
written Trial Ruling in favor of the Plaintiffs. Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment were entered. 
-6-
Defendant then took this appeal from the trial court7s 
Judgment• 
FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs Damon and Debbie Hugoe and/or Hugoe 
Trucking own property located within Woods Cross City, Davis 
County, State of Utah. Plaintiffs purchased the property, 
(hereinafter the "Property") in or about June, 1991. See R. 
at 2. 
2. Prior to the Hugoes' purchase of the Property, it 
was used by Clarence Newman who stored trailers used in his 
insulation business. See Transcript of Trial at p. 19. 
3. The Property was annexed into Woods Cross City in 
December, 1988. Prior to annexation, Hugoes' predecessor in 
interest, Frank Branch, had conversations with then Woods 
Cross City Mayor Gerald Argyle. Mayor Argyle represented to 
Branch that the annexation would not effect the use of the 
property. See Transcript of Trial at pp. 7-11. 
4. No predecessor in interest of Hugoes had ever 
sought or received any form of land use approval from either 
-7-
Davis County, or Woods Cross City. See Transcript of Trial 
at pp. 15, 21. 
5. Prior to purchasing the Property, Debbie Hugoe 
went to the Woods Cross City offices to check the zoning of 
the Property. She obtained a copy of the Chapter of the 
Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance relating to C-2 zoning, 
the zoning classification of the Property at that time. See 
R. at 249, Transcript of Trial at p. 51. 
6. Shortly after purchasing the Property, Hugoes 
began hauling fill onto the Property. Sometime in late July 
or early August, 1991, the Hugoes were informed by Woods 
Cross City that they needed a fill permit to place fill on 
the Property. See R. at 250 
7. On August 12, 1991, Debbie Hugoe went to the Woods 
Cross City offices to obtain a fill permit. While there, 
she spoke with Tim Stephens, the Woods Cross City Community 
Development Director. See R. at 250 
8. At that time, Woods Cross City had recently 
adopted a fill permit ordinance. The City did not yet have 
formal policies and procedures relating to the Ordinance in 
place, nor did they have preprinted fill permit forms. Mr. 
-8-
Stephens used a preprinted building permit form for the fill 
permit for the Hugoes. At that time, Mr. Stephens was aware 
that the Hugoes owned and operated Hugoe Trucking, Inc. See 
R. at 250. 
9. The Trial Court found that Mr. Stephens did not 
inform Debbie Hugoe at that time that site plan approval was 
required before any use could be made of the property. See 
R. at 250, 251. 
10. A fill permit was issued by Woods Cross City to 
the Hugoes on August 13, 1991. Hugoes completed the filling 
of their property in the Spring, 1992. See R. at 251. 
11. In early 1992, the Woods Cross City Council 
adopted a new zoning ordinance which changed the zoning on 
Hugoes' property and other property in the area to 1-1, 
light industrial. See R. at 251, 252. 
12. On March 27, 1992, Hugoes received a letter from 
Woods Cross City informing them that the use of their 
property for parking trucks was in violation of the new 
Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance. The letter gave Hugoes 
until April 20, 1992, to cease that use of the property. 
Hugoes refused to comply with that Order. Numerous other 
-9-
demands to cease that use of the property were made, and on 
November 13, 1997, Woods Cross City informed Hugoes that if 
they did not cease that use of their property, court action 
would be initiated to force compliance with the City's 
order. As a result of that letter, the instant action was 
filed by the Hugoes and trial ensued. See R. at 252. 
13. Hugoes have never made application for or received 
conditional use approval or site plan approval from Woods 
Cross City for the Property. See Transcript of Trial at pp. 
90, 91. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The facts presented at trial were legally insufficient 
to support a finding of zoning estoppel. The trial court's 
determination that Tim Stephens, the Woods Cross Zoning 
Administrator, had a duty to inform the Hugoes that the use 
of their property was improper is incorrect as a matter of 
law. In addition, the trial court's decision that the City 
is estopped from applying its zoning ordinances to prohibit 
the Hugoes7 use of their property contravenes significant 
-10-
policy considerations that underlie the law of nonconforming 
uses and the law of zoning in general. 
The trial court erred in this matter by applying the 
doctrine of zoning estoppel to the Hugoes' claims. The 
legal issues presented and the facts of the case should have 
been analyzed under the doctrine of vested rights, as 
pleaded. The theory of zoning estoppel was never pleaded 
and the issue was not tried by consent of the parties. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it 
concluded that the Hugoes had a legally nonconforming use. 
The trial court's conclusion that Hugoes were operating a 
"transfer company" within the meaning of the Woods Cross 
City Ordinances was incorrect. Hugoes have never 
established a business operation on the Property and their 
use of the Property to park their trucks is not a use which 
was authorized in the former C-2 commercial zone. 
The Hugoes do not have a right to continue parking 
large trucks on their property as a legal nonconforming use 
on the Property. Their use of the Property has never been 
legally established, and therefore, is not a use that 
"legally existed" before the 1992 zoning change. Their use 
-11-
is not consistent with the prior uses, and even if it were, 
there was no evidence offered at trial to establish that the 
former uses were legal. Because their use represents a 
change in use from the preceding occupant, the City's Site 
Plan regulations were applicable to their use and the 
failure to apply for and receive Site Plan approval 
forecloses any claim that their use was legally established. 
The trial court also concluded that the fill permit 
granted to the Hugoes was sufficient to grant them vested 
rights to the continued use of their Property to park their 
trucks. This conclusion is incorrect because the fill 
permit granted to them does not commit the Property to any 
particular use, and therefore, cannot form the basis of a 
finding that they have vested rights under Utah law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE CITY WAS ESTOPPED FROM 
APPLYING ITS ZONING REGULATIONS TO HUGOE'S PROPERTY 
In Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980), the 
Utah Supreme Court outlined the prerequisites for invoking 
the doctrine of zoning estoppel. Pursuant to the test set 
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forth in Young, the City must have committed an act or 
omission upon which the Hugoes could rely in good faith in 
making substantial changes in position or in incurring 
extensive expenses. Additionally, the action must be clear, 
definite and affirmative. If an omission is alleged as the 
basis of estoppel, the omission must be a negligent or a 
culpable omission where the party failing to act was under a 
duty to act. Mere silence or inaction will not operate to 
work an estoppel. In addition, the Hugoes have a duty to 
inquire and confer with the City regarding the uses of the 
Property which would be permitted. Utah County v. Young, 
615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980); Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 
836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992). Hugoes failed to sustain the 
burden of proof required of them to prove estoppel and the 
trial court erred in finding that the City was estopped from 
applying its zoning regulations to Hugoes' use of the 
Property. 
The trial court determined that Tim Stephens, Woods 
Cross City Community Development Director, had a duty to 
inform the Hugoes that their use of the Property was 
improper, and that his failure to comply with this duty was 
-13-
negligent or culpable. See R. at 23 9, 252. This conclusion 
is not supported by relevant law. 
In Young, Utah County issued a building permit to the 
Defendant under circumstances where the issuer of the permit 
actually knew that Young intended to use the building in 
violation of the zoning regulations at issue. Despite this 
knowledge, the Court found that estoppel was not 
appropriate. 
In Young, the Court cites the opinion in a case with 
facts more egregious than those found by the trial court in 
this matter. In Maloof v. Gwinnett County, 200 S.E.2d 749, 
231 Ga. 164 (1973), a Georgia court found that the county 
was not estopped from applying its zoning regulations to 
prohibit the owner's use of his property as a commercial dog 
kennel when he had been given verbal permission by someone 
in the City zoning office to build the kennel. The court 
reasoned: 
[T]he appellants in the present case did not 
receive a building permit authorizing them to 
construct a commercial dog kennel. At the time 
the kennel was built the zoning regulations of 
Gwinnett County did not permit the operation of a 
commercial dog kennel on their property, and they 
would be presumed to know this fact. Since the 
zoning regulations did not prohibit the 
-14-
construction of a private kennel on the 
appellants' property, the erection of the kennel 
did not put the county authorities on notice that 
the zoning regulation was being violated. 
Id. at 751. 
A similar result was reached in Jackson v. Kenai 
Peninsula Borough, 733 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1987), a case which 
cites the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in Young with 
approval. In Jackson, the Alaska Supreme Court found that 
application of estoppel was not appropriate where the City 
had issued a building permit to a landowner to build a 
garage in a residential zone even though the City knew of 
the landowner's commercial use of the property. 
Additionally, the court noted that the City had been aware 
of the landowner's use of the property for some 18 years 
before bringing any enforcement action. 
In reviewing the issues presented by the case, the 
Court noted that "estoppel should be invoked against a 
municipality in a zoning case *only in limited circumstances 
and with great caution.'" Jackson 733 P.2d 1038, 1041 
(quoting Town of Greenwich v. Kristoff, 481 A.2d 77, 81, 2 
Conn.App. 515 (1984)). The court further stated: 
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A number of substantive policy considerations 
underlie this rule: (1) the defendant seeking to 
invoke estoppel is under at least constructive 
notice of the zoning ordinance he seeks to avoid; 
(2) the purpose of zoning is to protect the public 
interest and zoning regulations are drawn by 
representation of the public will pursuant to the 
political process; (3) a particular officer or 
individual lacks authority to waive the public's 
right to enforce its ordinance. 
Jackson 733 P.2d at 1041 (quoting Wieck v. District of 
Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 383 A.2d 7, 13 (D.C.App. 
1978). 
This Court has previously recognized these same policy 
considerations, using strikingly similar language. In Town 
of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992), 
the Defendant sought to prohibit the City from precluding 
the Defendant's use of the property because the City had 
previously issued business licenses for the use. This Court 
quoted from a previous decision of the Utah Supreme Court, 
stating: 
It would be unreasonable and unrealistic to 
conclude that a clerk or a ministerial officer 
having no authority to do so, could bind the 
county to a variation of a zoning ordinance duly 
passed, to which everyone has notice by its 
passage and publication, because a ministerial 




Similarly, the Alta town clerk's issuance in this 
case of three lodging facility licenses does not 
estop Alta from denying use of BHC's residence as 
a lodging facility contrary to the Alta zoning 
ordinance. Additionally, failure to enforce for a 
time does not forfeit the power to enforce. 
Id. at 803. 
The trial court's legal conclusion in this matter that 
Tim Stephens, the Woods Cross Community Development Director 
"had a duty to act" is contrary to the law as set forth in 
the cases noted above. There was no proof offered at trial 
that Mr. Stephens had any authority to grant land use 
approval or to bind the City in any way. In fact, the only 
evidence on this point at trial was to the contrary. See 
Transcript of Trial at p.127. Therefore, to the extent Mr. 
Stephens did fail to inform Hugoes of the relevant 
development requirements, such failure cannot form the basis 
of "reasonable reliance" as required by the applicable law. 
The trial court's decision on this point also 
contravenes other significant legal policy implicit in the 
decisions of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court. If 
allowed to stand, the trial court's decision would render 
local zoning law completely ineffective by allowing the 
-17-
creation of nonconforming uses and vested rights by 
prescription, through the inability of local government to 
enforce its regulation against every violation. 
Utah law places the duty of becoming familiar with all 
the requirements of land development on the property owner. 
The City cannot possibly bear the burden of informing every 
landowner of the relevant development requirements relating 
to their property. While Hugoes offered testimony that they 
reviewed the zoning requirements relative to the C-2 zone, 
they offered no testimony that they reviewed the other 
applicable regulations of the City relating to Land 
Development and/or Site Plan approval. Reviewing the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Young, the Alaska Supreme Court 
commented: 
the Utah Court chose to place on the defendant the 
burden of determining whether a zoning ordinance 
applied to him in the absence of an affirmative 
assertion by the zoning authority that it did not. 
* * * 
We agree with this approach. A business person in 
Alaska must bear a number of administrative 
burdens. He or she must obtain a business 
license, file and pay appropriate taxes, and obey 
all relevant laws. The burden of locating the 
business in an appropriately zoned site must fall 
on the business person. 
-18-
Jackson 733 P.2d at 1042. Similarly, it follows that if a 
business owner must obey all relevant laws, they must obtain 
all necessary approvals, including site plan approval, to 
validly establish a business. Hugoes offered no evidence to 
the Court that they thus complied. To the contrary, Debbie 
Hugoe testified that they never sought any development 
approval for the Property, save the issuance of a fill 
permit. See Transcript of Trial at pp. 90, 91. 
The trial court found, as an essential element of the 
estoppel analysis, that the City's "long-standing 
acquiescence" to the alleged zoning violations on Hugoes' 
property limited the necessity of Hugoes' inquiry into the 
relevant zoning and land development requirements. See R at 
253. This conclusion is legally incorrect. 
Utah Courts have repeatedly recognized that: 
Zoning Ordinances are governmental acts which rest 
upon the police power, and as to violations 
thereof any inducements, reliances, negligence of 
enforcement, or other like factors are merely 
aggravations of the violation rather than excuses 
or justifications therefor. 
*** 
Ordinarily, a municipality is not precluded from 
enforcing its zoning regulations, when its 
officers have remained inactive in the face of 
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such violations. The promulgation of zoning 
ordinances constitutes a governmental function. 
This governmental power usually may not be 
forfeited by the action of local officers in 
disregard of the ordinance. 
Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976); 
Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61 (Utah 1981); Town of Alta 
v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 803 (quoting 8A McQuillan 
Municipal Corps. §25.349 (Rev. 1965)). 
The trial court's legal conclusion in this regard 
essentially establishes a right to acquire a non-conforming 
use by prescription. This is completely contrary to Utah 
law. The general rule which has been recognized by the 
Courts of Utah makes it clear that a city cannot forfeit the 
power to enforce its zoning ordinance by any past failure to 
enforce, unless that failure is somehow discriminatory. 
Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976); 
Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61 (Utah 1981); Town of Alta 
v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 803 (quoting 8A McQuillan 
Municipal Corps. §25.349 (Rev. 1965)). 
A contrary rule would prove disastrous for 
municipalities and all local governments with limited 
resources. Testimony at trial indicated that Tim Stephens 
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is a staff of one for the purposes of zoning enforcement in 
Woods Cross City. If the trial court's ruling were to 
stand, countless zoning violations would result in the 
establishment of nonconforming uses due to the lack of 
enforcement. Even in larger municipalities with full zoning 
enforcement staffs, it is impossible to enforce regulations 
against every violation. The trial court's legal conclusion 
in this regard places an extraordinary burden on 
municipalities. The law does not require municipalities to 
bear such a burden. 
It is also important to note that the trial court's 
decision in this matter essentially allows the Hugoes to use 
the Property free of any manner of local regulation. 
Testimony at trial indicated that the Hugoes' business is 
located in West Bountiful. Therefore, there is no business 
presence within Woods Cross for business licensing 
regulation purposes. The trial court determined that the 
site plan regulations found within the City's zoning 
ordinance were inapplicable. The trial court's decision 
also prohibits the City from enforcing any zoning 
regulations that might be applicable to the Hugoes' use of 
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the Property. The result is that the City is left with 
little or no regulatory authority to address land use issues 
on the Property. 
The trial court's legal conclusion regarding the 
application of zoning estoppel is also contrary to general 
policy considerations relating to zoning law and 
nonconforming uses in particular. Nonconforming uses are 
disfavored and are excepted from the general rule that 
zoning ordinances should be strictly construed in favor of 
the property owner; public policy encourages the 
elimination of nonconforming uses because they detract from 
the effectiveness of comprehensive land use regulations and 
often result in lower property values and blight. City of 
Glendale v. Aldabbagh, 939 P.2d 418, 189 Ariz. 140 (Az. 
1997); Lemon v. Speed, 694 So.2d 472, 96-858 La. App. 5th 
Cir. (La. 1997). Notwithstanding this rule of construction, 
the trial court construed the City's zoning regulations 
strictly against the City. See R. at 243. Additionally, 
the trial court's interpretations of the City's Zoning 
Regulations were legally incorrect. Therefore, the trial 
court's conclusion that the City was estopped from applying 
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its zoning regulations to the Hugoes' use of their Property 
is contrary to the stated policy of the law. Accordingly, 
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and this 
Court should enter judgment in favor of the City, 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE 
DOCTRINE OF ZONING ESTOPPEL 
It was procedural error for the trial court to have 
considered the doctrine of estoppel. The Complaint filed by 
the Hugoes states two causes of action: (1) declaratory 
relief, alleging that they have "vested rights" and a legal 
nonconforming use for the current use of their Property; and 
(2) injunctive relief, seeking to prevent the City from 
prosecuting any criminal action against the Hugoes pending a 
decision in this matter. There is no cause of action or 
claim for relief based on the doctrine of zoning estoppel. 
The word "estoppel" does not appear anywhere in the 
Complaint. Notwithstanding the absence of a claim of 
estoppel, the trial court based its ruling on a conclusion 
that the City is estopped from enforcing its zoning 
regulations to prohibit the Hugoes' use of their Property. 
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Woods Cross City did not consent to the court's 
consideration of a claim of estoppel and consideration of 
the issue by the trial court was fundamentally unfair to the 
City. Therefore, it was improper for the trial court to 
base its decision on a legal theory that was not raised by 
the pleadings. 
A. The Trial Court's Decision to Apply the Doctrine 
of Estoppel was Legally Incorrect. 
In its Trial Ruling, the trial court stated "[I]t 
appears to the Court that the facts of [Western Land 
Eguities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980)] do not 
fit well with the facts of the present case." R. at 233. 
However, reference to the actual facts and this Court's 
opinion in Western Land indicates to the contrary. 
In Western Land, a proposed developer had submitted an 
application and gone through a significant portion of the 
required hearing process on a residential subdivision 
application. While the application was still in process, 
the City attempted to enact a new zoning ordinance. The 
Court in Western Land chose to adopt a bright line rule for 
determining when rights to develop under a particular zoning 
ordinance vest, holding that xxan applicant is entitled to a 
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building permit or subdivision approval if his proposed 
development meets the zoning requirements in existence at 
the time of his application and if he proceeds with 
reasonable diligence, absent a countervailing public 
interest." Western Land, 617 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1980). 
Hugoes' Complaint seeks relief under a claim of "vested 
rights" as set forth in Western Land Equities. The issue 
raised by all the pleadings concerns the retroactive 
application of a new zoning ordinance. No claim of zoning 
estoppel was ever raised until it became apparent, through 
the process of Summary Judgment Motions, that the fill 
permit obtained by Hugoes was not sufficient to vest any 
rights to develop the Property other than those rights set 
forth in the City's fill permit ordinance. 
The trial court's Ruling also asserts that application 
of Western Land would be inappropriate because Western Land 
is primarily concerned with the vesting of rights in 
instances where a zoning change is enacted before a use is 
made of property. However, as shown in Sections I and III 
below, the trial court's conclusion that the Hugoes had 
legally established the use of their Property prior to the 
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zoning change is incorrect. The Western Land property owner 
had started preliminary preparations of the property for 
development, similar to the Hugoes' filling and grading 
their Property. Therefore, the trial court's conclusion 
that the facts of Western Land do not fit well with the 
facts of this case is erroneous. 
B. Trial of the Issue of Estoppel Absent Notice to 
the City and the City's Consent was Fundamentally 
Unfair. 
The Court's decision to imply a cause of action other 
than that set forth within the Complaint violates 
fundamental issues of fairness. The City was not prepared 
at trial to counter arguments made, based on evidence 
applicable to other claims, regarding elements of 
"reasonable reliance" and the significance of Hugoes' 
expenditures.1 No discovery was taken on these issues. In 
1
 Had notice been given to the City by way of 
Amended Complaint, or otherwise, regarding the Court's 
intent to analyze Hugoes' claims under the doctrine of 
zoning estoppel, the City may well have chosen to present 
evidence relating the significance of Hugoes' expenditures 
and the reasonableness of their alleged reliance. The 
record indicates that Hugoes used fill on their property 
which was received from their work on City projects. No 
evidence was adduced as to whether or not the Hugoes paid 
for this fill, or whether they received it at a discounted 
cost. Additionally, no evidence was adduced regarding how 
much of the grading work was done by Hugoe trucks and what 
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summary, the conduct of the defense may well have been 
significantly different if the City had been given any 
notice of the manner in which the trial court would analyze 
Hugoes' claims. Therefore, the trial court's consideration 
of a claim of estoppel was improper and was an abuse of 
discretion. 
C. The City did not Consent to Trial of the Issue of 
Estoppel. 
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried 
by express or implied consent of the parties, they 
shall be treated in all respects as if they had 
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of 
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to 
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after judgment; but failure to so amend does 
not affect the result of the trial of these 
issues. 
When evidence is introduced that is relevant to a pleaded 
issue, and the party against whom the amendment is urged has 
no reason to believe a new issue is being injected into the 
case, that party cannot be said to have impliedly consented 
value was placed on such work. Such evidence would have had 
direct application to the trial court's determination of the 
significance of the expenditures. No discovery was ever 
conducted on these issues because they were not implicated 
in the Complaint. 
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to trial of that issue. Keller v. Southwood North Medical 
Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998), (quoting Domar 
Ocean Transp. v. Independent Refining Co., 783 F.2d 1185 
(5th Cir. 1986)) . 
In this matter, there is no evidence that the City 
consented to trial of the estoppel issue. In fact, the 
record demonstrates to the contrary. The first appearance 
of any claim of estoppel is a footnote in Hugoes' Response 
to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment. See R. at 7, 14. 
The City objected to any consideration of the claim of 
estoppel in its Brief in Reply. See R. at 203. 
Additionally, the City objected to any consideration of any 
claim of estoppel in its closing argument. See Transcript 
of Trial, p. 183.2 Finally, all of the evidence submitted 
to the trial court which is claimed to support the 
application of estoppel is relevant to the Hugoes' initial 
claim that the fill permit which was issued by the City gave 
them approval to operate Hugoe Trucking, Inc. on the 
2
 It should be noted that while the record of this 
matter prepared by the trial court does contain a copy of 
the Transcript of Trial, that Transcript is not sequentially 
stamped in accordance with the rest of the record. 
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Property. Accordingly, there is no evidence in the record 
to suggest that the City ever consented to the trial of a 
claim of estoppel. Therefore, it was error for the trial 
court to have considered a claim of estoppel, and the 
judgment of the trial court should be reversed. 
III. 
HUGOES' USE OF THEIR PROPERTY IS NOT 
A LEGALLY NONCONFORMING USE 
Utah Law defines a nonconforming use as follows: 
(k) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that: 
(i) legally existed before its current 
zoning designation; 
(ii) has been maintained continuously 
since the time the zoning regulation 
governing the land changed; and 
(iii) because of subsequent zoning 
changes, does not conform with the zoning 
regulations that now govern the land. 
Section 10-9-103 (1) (k), Utah Code Annotated. 
The trial court in this matter found that the Hugoes 
were operating a "transfer company" within the meaning of 
the former Woods Cross City zoning ordinance. See R. at 
254. However, Hugoes' use of their Property was never 
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"legally established," and therefore, cannot be a legally 
nonconforming use. 
Chapter 13 of the former City Zoning Ordinance 
contained the regulations applicable to C-2 zoning, the 
relevant zone classification for the Hugoe/s Property. 
Section 11-13-1 established the use regulations of the zone 
and set forth a detailed list of permitted and conditional 
uses. That Section stated: 
In Commercial Zone C-2, no building or land shall 
be used, and no building shall be erected which is 
arranged, intended or designed to be used for 
other than one or more of the following uses: 
(Setting forth list of permitted and conditional 
uses). 
A copy of Chapter 13 of the former City Zoning Ordinance is 
contained in the Appendix to this Brief. Section 11-13-2, 
immediately following the above-cited section, stated: 
The above-specified stores, shops or businesses 
shall be retail establishments and shall be 
permitted only under the following conditions: 
(Setting forth restrictions relating to the zone). 
This language from the former ordinance makes it clear that 
uses within this zone are retail-type businesses. The 
evidence offered at trial in this matter established that 
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Hugoe Trucking is operated in West Bountiful. See 
transcript of Trial at p. 46, 85. The property at issue in 
this matter, located in Woods Cross, is used for the parking 
of the Hugoe's trucks. There was no testimony that Hugoes 
conducted any business on the Property. In fact, the 
testimony from Debbie Hugoe was clear that when they 
purchased the Property, they did so with the intention of 
someday putting their office there. See Transcript of Trial 
at p. 48. 
Hugoes use of the Property is not a commercial use 
recognized by the former C-2 zoning regulations. At best, 
their use is an accessory use to a non-existent primary use. 
Therefore, Hugoes use of the Property to park their trucks 
was not permitted under the former zoning ordinance. Thus, 
the use was not legally established prior to the City's 1992 
zoning change and therefore cannot be legally nonconforming. 
In the alternative, assuming arguendo that Hugoe's use 
of their Property could be properly characterized as a 
"transfer company", that use never received proper land use 
approval. Therefore, the use was never legally established, 
-31-
and cannot form the basis of a finding that the Hugoes had a 
nonconforming use. 
A. The Hucroe's Use of the Property is not Consistent 
with the Previous Uses. 
The trial court found that the Hugoe's use of the 
Property was consistent with the previous uses of the 
Property and therefore, the City site plan regulations were 
inapplicable. See R. at 238. Those determinations were 
erroneous, as a matter of law. 
Testimony at trial established that the prior occupant 
of the Property used it to store large trailers for his 
insulation business. See Transcript of Trial at p. 19. 
Assuming the Hugoes are operating a "transfer company" on 
the property as they have asserted and as the trial court 
found, that use is obviously markedly different from the use 
of the Property to store insulation trailers.3 Therefore, 
the trial court's conclusion that Hugoe's use of the 
Property was consistent with the previous uses is incorrect. 
3
 Chapter 15 of the former City Zoning Ordinance 
regulated uses within the Manufacturing Zone M-2. A 
permitted use in that zone were Equipment Yards, contractors 
yard and storage. Conditional Uses included freight 
terminals, railway or truck. 
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B. The Site Plan Regulations of the Former Zoning 
Ordinance Were Applicable to the Hucroe's Use, 
Section 11-18-9 of the former Zoning Ordinance set 
forth the Site Plan Regulations of the City. That Section 
read: 
SITE PLAN. In any commercial or manufacturing zone, 
and in all zones where construction of main 
buildings or dwellings other than single-family 
dwellings is proposed or involved, the location of 
main and accessory buildings on the site and in 
relation to one another, the traffic circulation 
features within the site, the height and bulk of 
buildings, the provision for off-street parking 
space, the provision for driveways for ingress and 
egress, and for the installation of curb, gutter 
and/or sidewalk when not already in place along the 
street bordering, and provision for other open space 
on the site, and the display of signs shall be in 
accordance with a site plan or plans or subsequent 
amendment thereof, approved in any case by the 
Planning Commission prior to issuance of a Building 
or Land-Use Permit. In approving site plans the 
Planning Commission may act on a site plan submitted 
to it or may act on its own initiative in proposing 
and approving a site plan, including any conditions 
or requirements designated or specified on or in 
connection therewith. A site plan shall include 
landscaping, fences, and walls designed to further 
the purposes of the regulations for commercial, 
industrial, and residential zones with two or more 
family dwelling units and such features shall be 
provided and maintained as a condition of the 
establishment and maintenance of any use to which 
they are appurtenant. In considering any site plan 
hereunder the Planning Commission shall endeavor to 
assure safety and convenience of traffic movements 
both within the area covered and in relation to 
access streets, harmonious and beneficial relation 
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among the buildings and uses in the area covered, 
and satisfactory and harmonious relation between 
such area and contiguous land and buildings and 
adjacent neighborhoods. 
All persons required to file a site plan under the 
provisions of this Section shall, at the time of the 
filing thereof, pay to the City a fee of $10.00 per 
acre, or any portion thereof, contained within the 
area covered b the site plan, with a minimum fee of 
$25.00, the same to cover part of the cost of 
processing and reviewing said site plan; provided, 
however, that said fee may be changed from time to 
time by Resolution of the City Council. 
The trial court interpreted this section in such a manner 
that "a site plan is needed for construction purposes, that 
change the character and use of the land, but not for 
continued use of the land, by new owners, under a previously 
allowable use." See R. at 238. As noted above, the trial 
court's conclusion that the prior uses of the Property were 
consistent with the Hugoe's use was incorrect. 
The trial court apparently also interpreted the site 
plan regulations to be applicable to commercially zoned 
property only when a building was to be constructed. See R. 
at 238, Transcript of Trial at p. 178. This interpretation 
is also incorrect. 
The first phrase of the ordinance (referring to 
commercial or manufacturing zones) is clearly disjunctive 
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from the second phrase which refers to all zones where 
"construction of main buildings or dwellings .•. is 
proposed... ." This construction of the ordinance is made 
clear by the following provisions of the ordinance setting 
forth the considerations of site plan approval. Issues such 
as traffic circulation, provisions for off-street parking, 
and the display of signs are considerations that have no 
necessary relation to the construction of buildings. They 
are however, critical to the proper design of commercial or 
manufacturing areas. These considerations allow 
municipalities to appropriately plan for heavy traffic 
patterns associated with commercial uses and heavy equipment 
traffic associated with manufacturing uses. From the 
foregoing, it is apparent that the trial court 
misinterpreted the site plan regulations. 
The change in use of the Property, as demonstrated 
above, initiated the City site plan regulations. The 
testimony at trial was clear that no site plan application 
was ever filed. Therefore, Hugoes never legally established 
their use of the Property. 
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IV. 
HUGOES' DO NOT HAVE VESTED RIGHTS TO CONTINUE 
THE USE OF THEIR PROPERTY 
The trial court's Trial Ruling suggested that the fill 
permit granted to the Hugoes was sufficient to validly 
establish their use of the Property. This conclusion is 
completely contrary to the reasoning that underlies the 
"vested rights" decision of the courts of this and other 
states. In Western Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 
388 (Utah 1980), the Court held that applicants for building 
permits or subdivision approval have a right to expect that 
the rules governing their applications will not be changed 
mid-stream. However, the case clearly recognizes that an 
applicant must have committed its property to some 
particular use that is consistent with the current 
regulations. 
While reviewing the general elements of a claim of 
zoning estoppel, the Western Land court stated: 
An additional requirement generally considered in 
zoning estoppel cases is that of the existence of 
some physical construction as an element of 
substantial reliance. Preconstruction activities 
such as the execution of architectural drawings or 
the clearing of land and widening of roads are not 
sufficient to create a vested right, nor generally 
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are activities that are not exclusively related to 
the proposed project. 
Western Land, 617 P.2d 388, 392. 
In this matter, the fill permit granted to the Hugoes 
did nothing to commit the Property to any particular use. 
Additionally, their use of the Property, whether as a 
"transfer company" or otherwise, was not consistent with the 
zoning ordinance. Accordingly, Hugoes do not have vested 
rights to any use of the Property. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the City 
requests that the judgment of the trial court be reversed 
and that this Court direct the entry of a judgment holding 
that the City is not estopped from applying its current 
zoning regulations to preclude the Hugoes' use of their 
Property as a parking or storage yard for their trucks and 
that the Hugoes do not have any vested right to their 
current use of the Property. 
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DATED this <a*^ day of January, 1999. 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
Todd J, 
Attori 
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A D D E N D U M 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDIClA&DISTRIC' 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH V \ L 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT \ Mil 
DAMON HUGOE, DEBBIE HUGOE, and, 
HUGOE TRUCKING, INC., 
a Utah corporation 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal 
corporation and political subdivision of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
TRIAL RULING 
Case No. 960700425 
This matter came before the Court for trial to the Court on February 12, 1997. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Gregory Simonsen and Bryan Booth. The defendant was represented by 
Michael Hayes and Todd Godfrey. After the presentation of evidence and argument, the Court 
took the case under advisement to prepare a written opinion. The Court rules as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiffs' property and that of Mr. Richard Fleming lie adjacent to one another on the 
south side of 500 South at approximately 1300 West in Woods Cross City. 500 South is a major 
East-West thoroughfare in the city. 
Both parcels were previously owned by Mr. Frank Branch. In December of 1988 both 
parcels were annexed into Woods Cross City. 
Prior to December 1988 the property was located in the unincorporated area of Davis 
County. Mr. Fleming purchased his parcel from Mr. Branch in 1985. He obtained permission 
from Davis County to place a culvert in front of his property to allow better access and to haul in 
fill. Much of the fill was hauled onto the property from Davis County retention basins as a result 
of the 1983 flooding. 
Mr. Fleming is in the construction business. Since he purchased the property in 1985, he 
has used it continuously to park dump trucks, belly dumps and various other pieces of heavy 
equipment. 
Mr. Branch retained ownership of the parcel now owned by the plaintiff. Over the years 
from at least 1985 until 1991, Mr. Branch allowed Mr. Clarence Newman to use the property. 
Mr. Newman was in the insulation business and used the property to park semi-trucks and trailers 
and large insulation trucks. 
The use of the two parcels for truck and equipment parking was open and obvious and 
clearly observable to anyone traveling on 500 South. The use continued from at least 1985 until 
present. 
In the year leading up to annexation of the property into Woods Cross City, Mr. Branch 
and Mr. Fleming had several conversations with the then mayor, Mr. Argyle, and attended 
several public meetings where they were encouraged to consent to annexation, with the assurance 
that they would be able to continue the current use of their property. Ms. Hugoe also attended 
some of these same meetings with her aunt, also a resident of the area. 
Prior to June 1991 plaintiffs became interested in the property and Ms. Hugoe went to the 
Woods Cross City offices to check the zoning of the property. She spoke with Mr. Stephens, the 
Community Development Director. He gave her a copy of the zoning ordinance, which showed 
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the property was in a C-2 zone. She noted that a permitted use in that zone was a "transfer 
company." 
Mr. Stephens had been employed as the Community Development Director for Woods 
Cross City since 1989. Before that he worked in the planning department of Davis County. In 
his position with Davis County he was familiar with the unincorporated area of the county. 
Ms. Hugoe told Mr. Stephens that they were a trucking company. Trucks bearing the 
Hugoe Trucking logo were often on the streets of Woods Cross City. Hugoe Trucking had been 
used on several road construction jobs in the city hauling road base and "roto-mill" to and from 
the road projects. Mr. Stephens was aware that the Hugoes were involved in a trucking business. 
Ms. Hugoe inspected the property and the adjacent area and observed that the property 
was being used for truck and equipment parking that seemed to be consistent with the zoning 
use. 
Plaintiffs purchased the property on June 11, 1991 and immediately began parking their 
trucks on their property. 
Shortly after purchase they began hauling fill onto the property, some of it from projects 
they were working on in the city. A Scott Anderson from the city informed Ms. Hugoe that they 
needed a fill permit to place fill on the property. 
On August 12, 1991 Ms. Hugoe went to the Woods Cross City offices to get a fill permit. 
She talked to Mr. Stephens; he informed her that the city had just adopted the fill ordinance and 
they were still in the process of setting up policies and procedures. They did not have a fill 
permit form yet so Mr. Stephens used a building permit form. They discussed the type of fill 
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they were using and that it was coming from city streets and other sources. He said it could not 
contain wood or concrete. He was aware that they were a trucking company. 
Ms. Hugoe testified that Mr. Stephens said nothing about plaintiffs not being able to use 
the property for parking trucks or that they needed a site plan. 
Mr. Stephens said he could not remember discussing that with her but conveniently 
produced a memo to the file stating he told her that she needed a site plan and gave her a site 
plan application. 
The permit itself makes no mention of the site plan requirement or any particular use, and 
the comment portion of the permit is blank. The fill permit was signed by Mr. Stephens on 
August 13, 1991, the same date that the memo to the file bears. 
Plaintiffs proceeded to complete the fill of the property hauling in approximately 100 
truck loads of fill, which was topped by other materials to provide a smooth surface for the 
parking of their trucks. The value of the fill and the work performed to grade it and finish it was 
over $100,000. 
All fill was completed by Spring of 1992. At all times after their purchase of the property 
they continued to park trucks on their property. When the fill operation temporarily required 
them to move their trucks they parked them on the Fleming property next door. 
Use of the property by plaintiff to park trucks was consistent with other property uses in 
the area. Use of the property in the area for commercial and industrial purposes has changed 
very little over the years. 
In the early part of 1992, Woods Cross City adopted a new zoning ordinance which 
changed the zoning on plaintiffs' property and other property in the area to 1-1, light industrial. 
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On March 27, 1992, plaintiffs received a letter from Woods Cross City informing them 
for the first time that the use of their property for parking trucks was in violation of the new 
zoning ordinance. The letter gave plaintiffs until April 20, 1992 to cease and desist. Plaintiffs 
refused to comply with the order and after numerous demands over the years, on November 13, 
1997, defendant's attorney sent a letter to plaintiffs. The letter stated that unless they complied 
within 14 days court action would be started to force compliance. 
As a result of that letter this action was filed by plaintiffs and this trial ensued. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court rules as follows: 
RULING 
Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to continue the use they now make of the property, 
which consists primarily of a storage yard for their trucks and trailers, through the operation of 
estoppel, occasioned by defendants acts and omissions, as a non-conforming use under the 
defendants' new zoning ordinance. Plaintiff also must prove the use of their land meets the legal 
requirements to be considered a non-conforming use. Therefore, although both issues are 
interrelated, the Court will address the estoppel issue first, as a determination in plaintiffs' favor 
on the estoppel issue helps satisfy one of the elements required under non-conforming use. 
ESTOPPEL 
Current Utah law relating to zoning estoppel is primarily set forth in two opinions of the 
Utah Supreme Court: Utah County v. Young. 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980); and Western Land 
Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). Peculiarly, although the two cases were 
released only one month apart, there is no mention in either of the other, although the issues 
discussed often overlap. Western Land, the latter of the two, discusses the law of zoning 
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estoppel as if no Utah court, let alone the very same court a mere one month prior, had ever 
addressed the issue, citing case law from other jurisdictions in illustrating possible approaches to 
the issue. The Western Land Court ultimately concludes that an application of zoning estoppel 
would not be correct in that case, proceeding instead to analyze the case under a "vested right" 
theory, certainly related, but not quite the same. The Court states: 
In rejecting the zoning estoppel approach in this matter, we are not prepared 
to state that it would never be relevant to a determination of the validity of a 
retroactive application of a zoning ordinance. We are of the view, however, that the 
relevant public and private interests are better accommodated in the first instance by 
a different approach. 
Western Land. 617 P.2d at 392-393. The Court then proceeds to discuss how and when property 
owners' rights to a particular use might vest. In Western Land, the facts were that the owner had 
purchased the land, and then, before any construction or other use of the property commenced, 
the city amended its zoning ordinance, precluding the use for which the owner had intended for 
the property. Rejecting a balancing-test type approach based on a weighing of the resources 
which an owner has committed to a project against the possibility of other appropriate uses of the 
land and the public welfare, the Court held that: 
[A]n applicant is entitled to a building permit or subdivision approval if his proposed 
development meets the zoning requirements in existence at the time of his 
application and if he proceeds with reasonable diligence, absent a compelling, 
countervailing public interest. Furthermore, if a city or county has initiated 
proceedings to amend its zoning ordinances, a landowner who subsequently makes 
application for a permit is not entitled to rely on the original zoning classification. 
Id., at 396. It appears to the Court that the facts of Western Land do not fit well with the facts of 
the present case. Here, there is no dispute that a permit was indeed issued, rather than simply 
applied for, although the parties dispute that permit's relevance. Plaintiffs do not seek, in this 
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action, a building permit at all, rather they seek a determination that the use they presently make 
of their property is legally non-conforming under the current zoning ordinance. Furthermore, as 
found by the Court, the property was used the same before the ordinance was changed as it is 
presently. As stated above, and addressed more fully below, to be currently legal as non-
conforming, it must have been allowable under the prior zoning ordinance. The case that is most 
directly controlling with respect to that issue is Utah County v. Young {supra). There the 
Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of estoppel in a zoning case. There was no 
intervening zoning change, as there was in Western Land, and as there is in this case, yet the 
intervening zoning change is only a secondary issue in this case if the Court finds the use legal 
under the prior zoning law. 
The facts of Young are essentially as follows: The landowners owned property zoned for 
agricultural use only. They applied to the county for a building permit, for a "J"-type non-
residential, non-public use building, such that would include a barn. The permit was issued for 
the construction of a barn, with an estimated value of $1,600. The landowners thereafter 
proceeded to construct a building which, although resembling a barn, included an auction block, 
bleachers, commercial plumbing and wiring, and which cost $23,000, and began operating a 
livestock auction. The trial court found that at the time the landowners applied for their building 
permit, and all through the intervening time until the county brought the action, the landowners 
"knew that such a use would not be permitted under the zoning laws, and no agent or employee 
of Utah County led them to believe otherwise." The trial court stated on the matter: 
The only defense presented by the defendants was that they were entitled to 
the application of equitable principles to prevent the county from enjoining his use 
and operation of the land as a commercial 'Auction Barn' because of claimed 
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misleading acts inducing his belief that on completion of the structure he would be 
entitled to commercial use of it. The findings of the advisory jury, concurred in by 
the Court, do not support any such misleading action, and to the contrary establish 
that the defendants well-knew the zoning restrictions, and that they precluded 
commercial use of the structure. Therefore, the rules of equity do not assist them in 
their claim and the right of plaintiff to a permanent injunction prohibiting further 
commercial use of the property is granted by the Court. 
Young. 615 P.2d at 1266-67. The landowners claimed that even though they had knowledge of 
the zoning laws, the alleged misleading actions of the building inspector should have entitled 
them to an estoppel. On three grounds the Supreme Court ruled against the landowners. First, 
the trial court found that there was no misleading by the county's agents. Second, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
[T]he structure, itself, which resembles a barn, does not violate the zoning laws; it 
is only the commercial use thereof that is proscribed. Third, as a matter of law, 
estoppel may not be used as defense by one,who has acted fraudulently, or in bad 
faith, or with knowledge. 
Id., at 1267. The Court goes on to establish the elements of a claim of estoppel in a zoning case 
as follows: 
To invoke the doctrine the county must have committed an act or omission upon 
which the developer could rely in good faith in making substantial changes in 
position or incurring extensive expenses. The action upon which the developer claims 
reliance must be of a clear, definite and affirmative nature. If the claim be based on 
an omission of the local zoning authority, omission means a negligent or culpable 
omission where the party failing to act was under a duty to do so. Silence or inaction 
will not operate to work an estoppel. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 
landowner has a duty to inquire and confer with the local zoning authority regarding 
the uses of the property that would be permitted. 
Id., at 1267-68. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial court's 
judgment against the landowners. 
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Here, the facts, as stated, supra, would show an entirely different scenario than those at 
issue in Young. The property in question had been historically used, first in Davis County, and 
later, after being annexed into defendant Woods Cross, for the parking of trucks, the same use for 
which defendant seeks an injunction. It had been so used, on a continuous basis, known to both 
Davis County and defendant, for at least 6 years prior to the time it was purchased by 
plaintiffs. The surrounding property owners had made similar use of their (identically-zoned) 
land. Defendants' mayor had induced the prior owners of plaintiffs' land to agree to the 
annexation with the assurances that they could continue using the land in the manner which that 
prior owner, and current plaintiffs, were using it. Plaintiffs went to defendant's offices and 
reviewed the zoning ordinance, and reasonably believed (as set forth, infra) the use they wished 
to put the land to would be allowed. After purchasing the land and continuing to use it as it had 
been historically used, plaintiffs began to put fill on the land to make it more acceptable for the 
parking of their trucks. Part of this fill came from the rotograding of defendant's streets, a fact 
known to defendant. 
They were then contacted by defendant and told that they needed to get a "fill permit" 
before continuing to place the fill, but, significantly, they were not told that they could not park 
their trucks on the land. Plaintiff Debbie Hugoe then went to the defendant's offices and 
procured the "fill permit" from Tim Stephens, defendant's director of community development. 
Mr. Stephens was fully aware that plaintiffs owned and operated a trucking company, that they 
parked their trucks on the subject property, and that they were obtaining the fill permit to 
improve the conditions on that property for such truck parking. 
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There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether Mr. Stephens told Ms. Hugoe that they 
needed a site plan. Ms. Hugoe stated that there was no such mention. Mr. Stephens says he 
can't remember, but he conveniently produced a memo to the file referring to a conversation 
about the site plan. 
The Court finds it inconsistent that an event that was so important that it triggered a 
memo to the file would not have likewise triggered at least a notation or comment on the fill 
permit. The fill permit was signed by Mr. Stephens on the same date as the file memo but is 
silent on the issue. The comment portion is blank. 
After obtaining the "fill permit," plaintiffs continued to place fill on the property, 
eventually placing fill and performing grading, all with a value well over $100,000. It was only 
as this work was being completed that defendant informed plaintiffs of the recent zoning change 
that prohibited the use plaintiffs were making of their property. Defendants argue that no site 
plan had been approved, no building permit issued, and that plaintiffs use therefore could not 
have been "lawfully existing" prior to the zoning change. As support, they cite Western Land. 
The Court finds little credence in their argument for several reasons. First, as set forth, supra, 
Western Land is primarily concerned with the vesting of rights in instances where a zoning 
changes before a use is made of a property, a scenario different than that before the Court. 
Second, the "fill permit" issued by defendant was issued long after the current use was 
made of the property, and was only obtained for leveling off and making the property more 
serviceable under its current (and prior) use. Plaintiffs needed no building permit to use the land 
in the manner in which it had always been used, in fact there were no "buildings" needed 
whatsoever. As to defendant's argument that a "site plan" was needed to be legal, the Court 
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cannot agree. The only thing that changed when ownership changed was the name and shape of 
the trucks being parked on the land. There are no allegations that Davis County, the prior zoning 
authority, had required a site plan and that there had been a failure to comply. There is no 
evidence before the Court that the use had ever, prior to 1992, been questioned by any authority 
as being anything but proper. Certainly defendants do not require a site plan every time a 
business property is sold and new owners use the property for essentially the same purpose, 
without major change. When minor changes are sought, a building permit, not a site plan, is 
required. The language of the site plan ordinance is telling in this regard: 
SITE PLAN. In any commercial or manufacturing zone, and in all zones where 
construction of main buildings or dwellings other than single-family dwellings is 
proposed or involved, the location of main and accessory buildings on the site and 
in relation to one another, the traffic circulation features within the site, the height 
and bulk of buildings, the provisions for off-street parking space, the provisions for 
driveways for ingress and egress, and for the installation of curb, gutter and /or 
sidewalk when not already in place along the street bordering, and provision for other 
open space on the site, and the display of signs shall be in accordance with a site plan 
or plans or subsequent amendment thereof, approved in any case by the Planning 
Commission prior to the issuance of a Building or Land-Use permit. . . 
(Section 11-18-9 of defendants' former City ordinances. This is the text submitted by defendant 
as part of their reply memorandum to their motion for summary judgment.) It is clear that a site 
plan is needed for construction purposes that change the character and use of the land, but not for 
continued use of the land, by new owners, under a previously allowable use. 
Third, and finally, even if the Court was to proceed under Western Land, it is undisputed 
that plaintiff applied for, and obtained a "fill permit." The fill permit was granted with 
defendant's knowledge that plaintiff was using the fill to be able to better park his trucks, a use 
that had gone on for years prior. This Court can see no reason to limit the holding of Western 
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Land to only building permits and subdivision approvals. Other types of permits may reference 
the same type of rights, such as the liquor license in Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Comm'n. 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). Defendant required plaintiffs to obtain a fill permit to place 
fill, fill that plaintiffs felt was necessary to make better, but the same, use of their property. The 
permit was obtained, and plaintiffs continued the same use thereafter. As plaintiffs actually 
obtained the only type of "building permit" either party reasonably might argue was ever at issue 
in this case, with the full knowledge of defendant that the prior use would be continued, Western 
Land cannot but help plaintiffs' case, to the extent that it applies. 
Reviewing the elements of estoppel set forth by Young, defendant must have: 
L. Committed an act or omission, and if an omission, it must be a negligent or 
culpable omission, where the party failing to act was under a duty to do so. 
The Court finds that Mr. Stephens, in first requiring and then issuing a fill permit to 
plaintiffs, knowing full well the use to which the property was being put and would be put in the 
future, without telling plaintiffs that there was any problem with that use, or noting the same on 
the fill permit, constitutes a negligent omission by one who had a duty to act. Mr. Stephens' 
omission was not mere silence or inaction, as may have been the case in Young. He had personal 
knowledge of the use of the property, a use which had never been questioned by defendants, and 
a use which could reasonably be allowed under the then current zoning ordinance. If he had 
questions or believed that use to be improper, then was the time to speak, not after plaintiffs had 
expended substantial resources. 
2i Good faith reliance on the act or omission in making substantial changes in 
position or incurring extensive expenses. 
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The Court finds that there is evidence only of good faith on the part of plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs had no knowledge that there was even a potential problem with their land use until 
defendants informed them of the zoning change after significant resources had already been 
committed to the fill project. The Court also rules that the expenses, with a value greater than 
$100,000, outlaid by plaintiffs in such reliance were "extensive." 
3,. Duty to inquire and confer with the local zoning authority regarding the uses of 
the property that would be permitted. 
Plaintiff went to defendant's offices and reviewed the local zoning ordinance before 
purchasing the property. The specific language of the zoning ordinance itself caused her to 
reasonably believe that the use, a use to which the property had been put by the prior owners, 
would be allowed. Knowing that the prior owners, as well as the surrounding property owners 
used their identically zoned property in the same or similar manner, with defendant's 
longstanding acquiescence, a review of the ordinance must have seemed nothing more than a 
formality to plaintiffs. 
The Court cannot envision how, under the facts of this case, plaintiffs would have had a 
further duty to "inquire and confer" with the local zoning authority to be sure they could use the 
property the same way it had been historically used, the same way surrounding property owners 
used their property, especially in light of the zoning ordinance's seeming express approval of 
such use. 
The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs have met the elements required by Young to 
estop defendant from arguing (or prosecuting plaintiff in a criminal or administrative case) that 
plaintiffs' use of their property was not legally conforming to the prior zoning ordinance. 
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Legal Non-Conforming Use 
To enable plaintiffs to prove they are entitled to continue their use, a use which is 
indisputably not allowed as a conforming use under the current zoning ordinance, they must 
show that it meets the requirement to be a non-conforming use under the applicable law. Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-103(k) states: 
(k) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that: 
(I) legally existed before its current zoning designation; 
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation 
governing the land changed; and 
(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with the zoning 
regulations that now govern the land. 
The Court's finding as to the first element is set forth in the prior section, supra. As an 
independent, but interrelated as it goes to the issue of plaintiffs' reasonable belief under estoppel, 
grounds for finding the first element required for a non-conforming use, the Court sets forth the 
following: Under the zoning ordinances in effect at the time plaintiffs purchased their property 
and when they began their current use, their land was zoned "C-2." Permitted uses under C-2 
include "transfer company." The parties are in disagreement as to the definition of a "transfer 
company." The zoning ordinance itself provides no definition of "transfer company," neither is 
it defined by Utah statutory or case law. The Court found one case, from Missouri, that 
attempted to define its meaning. The court in Armco SteeL v. City of Kansas City. Missouri, 883 
S.W.2d 3, 8-9 (Mo. 1994) states: 
The term "transfer company" is defined as "a transportation company that transfers 
passengers or baggage usually for a short distance between specified points or 
terminals." Webster's Third International Dictionary (Unabridged) at 2427. In a 
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broader sense used to describe certain litigants in Missouri case law, a transfer 
company includes any company in the business of transporting freight or other 
products for hire. See, e.g.. State ex rel. Beaufort Transfer Co.. 610 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. 
App. 1980); Govreau v. Farmington Transfer Co.. 473 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. App. 1971); 
Mason v. F.W. Strecker Transfer Co.. 409 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. 1966). 
In Utah, there have been several cases dealing with "transfer companies." Sims v. Public 
Service Commission 117 Utah 516; 218 P.2d 267 (Utah 1950) dealt with the "Salt Lake Transfer 
Company" and its permit as a contract motor carrier to haul sugar for the "Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Company" between West Jordan and Salt Lake City, Utah. Murphy, dba Alex Pickering 
Transfer Company, v. Public Service Commission. 514 P.2d 804 (Utah 1973) dealt with a permit 
dispute against the Utah P.S.C. by a contract carrier. Ostler V. Albina Transfer Company. Inc.. 
781 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) is a personal injury action discussing an accident involving a 
"truck and semitrailer unit parked on the paved shoijlder of the roadway." 
Plaintiff Hugoe Trucking, Inc. is a contract motor carrier licensed by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the State of Utah. It is the Court's ruling that Hugoe Trucking is a 
"transfer company" within the meaning of defendants' prior zoning ordinance. Defendants 
would like to persuade the Court that the proper classification of plaintiffs' use of their property 
is one found under zone "M-2," at (E), "Equipment yards, contractor's yard and storage." 
Apparently this is as a result of Hugoe trucking's frequent work with contractors, hauling 
construction materials. The only evidence before the Court is that plaintiff Hugoe Trucking is 
not, and never has been, a contractor. 
It is clear that under Utah law: 
[Z]oning ordinances are in derogation of a property owner's common-law right to 
unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions therein restricting property uses 
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should be strictly construed, and provisions permitting property uses should be 
liberally construed in favor of the property owner. 
Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment. 893 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Plaintiff Hugoe Trucking is a trucking, and thus, "transfer" company. Nowhere in the prior 
zoning ordinance is there a specific mention of any zone designated for "trucking company." 
The only possibility is under "transfer company." The Court therefore finds that the use of 
plaintiffs' property prior to the zoning change was "legally existing." 
It has not been argued by the parties, and is thus apparently not at issue, but the Court 
also finds that the use was "maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation 
governing the land changed." There was a period of time when plaintiffs trucks were parked off-
site to enable the filling and grading process, yet such would not constitute a "discontinuance." 
The Court has been unable to find Utah case law on the issue, but a State of Washington case 
dealing with discontinuance in a non-conforming use stated: 
The mere temporary cessation of a nonconforming use, however, does not 
effect abandonment or discontinuance of the nonconforming use. 8A E. McQuillin, 
The Law of Municipal Corporations @ 25.196 (3d ed. rev. 1976). 
Andrew v. King County. 586 P.2d 509, 513 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). Therefore, to the extent that 
it is at issue, the Court rules that plaintiffs' use was "maintained continuously since the time the 
zoning regulation governing the land changed." 
The third element is not disputed by the parties. Therefore, the Court would find that 
plaintiffs' current, and past, use of their property is a legal non-conforming use. As such, the 
Court would find in favor of plaintiffs and enjoin any further action by defendant not consistent 
with this ruling. 
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Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to prepare findings and judgment in accordance with the 
Court's Ruling and send a copy to opposing counsel at least 5 days before being submitted to the 
Court for signature. 
Dated May 1^,1998 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on May 
, 1998, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Gregory M. Simonsen 
Clark B.Fetzer 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Michael Z. Hayes 
Attorney for Defendant 
1245 Brickyard Road No. 250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
JamesSJE. Merrell 
Law CDerk, Second District Court 
\°p-
18 
lC ' . f ' ' * -
Gregory M. Simonsen (#4669) 
Bryan H. Booth (#7471) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
B ? ~ - i£> 
.ST 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAMON HUGOE, DEBBIE HUGOE, and 




WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal 
corporation and political subdivision of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960700425 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
This matter came before the Court for trial to the Court on February 12, 1997. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Gregory Simonsen and Bryan Booth of the law firm of Kirton & McConkie. The 
defendant was represented by Michael Hayes and Todd Godfrey of the law firm of Mazuran & 
Hayes. After the presentation of evidence and argument, the Court took the case under advisement 
to prepare a written opinion. On May 19, 1998, the Court issued a Trial Ruling in favor of plaintiffs. 
The Court now enters these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs' property and that of Mr. Richard Fleming lie adjacent to one another on the 
south side of 500 South at approximately 1300 West in Woods Cross City, Davis County, Utah. The 
street known as 500 South is a major East-West thoroughfare in the city. 
2. The legal description of Plaintiff s property is as follows: 
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet 
West and North 0°26' East 330 feet and West 235.8 feet from the 
Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet; thence South 670.14 
feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65 feet along said street; 
thence North 670.14 feet to the point of beginning. 
AND 
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet 
West and North 0°26' West and North 0°26' East 330 feet and West 
105.8 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet; 
thence South 670.14 feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65 
feet along said street; thence North 670.14 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
ALSO: 
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet 
West and North 0°26' East 330 feet and West 170.8 feet from the 
Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet; thence South 670.14 
feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65 feet along said street; 
thence North 670.14 feet to the point of beginning. 
ALSO: 
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 660 feet 
West from the Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, 
2 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian; and running thence North 330 feet; 
thence West 72.8 feet; thence South 330 feet; thence East 72.8 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
Hereafter this parcel shall be referred to as "the property" or "plaintiffs' property." 
3. Both plaintiffs' parcel and Mr. Fleming's parcel were previously owned by Mr. Frank 
Branch. 
4. In December of 1988 both parcels were annexed into Woods Cross City. Prior to 
December 1988, the property was located in the unincorporated area of Davis County. 
5. Mr. Fleming purchased his parcel from Mr. Branch in 1985. Mr. Fleming obtained 
permission from Davis County to place a culvert in front of his property to allow better access and to 
haul in fill. Much of the fill was hauled onto the property from Davis County retention basins as a 
result of the 1983 flooding. 
6. Mr. Fleming is in the construction business. Since he purchased the property in 1985, 
he has used it continuously to park dump trucks, belly dumps, and various other pieces of heavy 
equipment. 
7. Mr. Branch retained ownership of the parcel now owned by the plaintiff. Over the 
years from at least 1985 until 1991, Mr. Branch allowed Mr. Clarence Newman to use the property. 
Mr. Newman was in the insulation business and used the property to park semi-trucks and trailers 
and large insulation trucks. 
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8. The use of the two parcels for truck and equipment parking was open and obvious and 
clearly observable to anyone traveling on 500 South. The use continued from at least 1985 until 
present. 
9. In the year leading up to annexation of the property into Woods Cross City, Mr. 
Branch and Mr. Fleming had several conversations with the then Woods Cross City mayor, Mr. 
Argyle, and attended several public meetings where they were encouraged to consent to annexation, 
with the assurance that they would be able to continue the current use of their property. Ms. Debbie 
Hugoe also attended some of these same meetings with her aunt who was a resident of the area. 
10. Prior to June 1991 plaintiffs became interested in purchasing the property, and Ms. 
Hugoe went to the Woods Cross City offices to check the zoning of the property. She spoke with 
Mr. Tim Stephens, the Community Development Director. He gave her a copy of the zoning 
ordinance, which showed the property was in a C-2 zone. She noted that a permitted use in that zone 
was a "transfer company." 
11. Ms. Hugoe told Mr. Stephens that she operated a trucking company. Trucks bearing 
the Hugoe Trucking logo were often on the streets of Woods Cross City. Hugoe Trucking had been 
used on several road construction jobs in the city hauling road base and "roto-mill" to and from the 
road projects. Mr. Stephens was aware that the Hugoes were involved in a trucking business. 
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12. Ms. Hugoe inspected the property and the adjacent area and observed that the 
property was being used for truck and equipment parking that seemed to be consistent with the 
zoning use. 
13. Plaintiffs purchased the property on June 11, 1991 and immediately began parking 
their trucks on their property. 
14. Shortly after purchase, plaintiffs began hauling fill onto the property, some of it from 
projects they were working on in Woods Cross City. A Scott Anderson from the city informed Ms. 
Hugoe that they needed a fill permit to place fill on the property. 
15. On August 12, 1991 Ms. Hugoe went to the Woods Cross City offices to obtain a fill 
permit. She talked to Mr. Stephens about the permit. Mr. Stephens informed her that the city had 
just adopted the fill ordinance and was still in the process of setting up policies and procedures. The 
city had not yet designed a preprinted fill permit form, so Mr. Stephens used a preprinted building 
permit form. Mr. Stephens and Ms. Hugoe discussed the type of fill plaintiffs were using and that 
the fill was coming from city streets and other sources. He was aware that Ms. Hugoe's business, 
Hugoe Trucking, Inc, was a trucking company. 
16. At trial there was conflicting evidence as to whether Mr. Stephens told Ms. Hugoe 
that a site plan was required for the property. The court having weighed the credibility of the 
witnesses and the evidence finds that Ms. Hugoe's testimony that no site plan was discussed is the 
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most credible. Hence, the court finds that Mr. Stevens did not tell Ms. Hugoe of any site plan 
requirement. 
17. The fill permit issued to Ms. Hugoe by Woods Cross City makes no mention of the 
site plan requirement or any particular use, and the comment portion of the permit is blank. The fill 
permit was signed by Mr. Stephens on August 13, 1991. 
18. Plaintiffs proceeded to complete the fill of their property by hauling in approximately 
100 truck loads of fill which was topped by other materials to provide a smooth surface for the 
parking of plaintiffs' trucks. The value of the fill and the work performed to grade it and finish it 
was over $100,000. 
19. The filling of the property was completed by Spring of 1992. At all times after their 
purchase of the property, plaintiffs continued to park trucks on their property. When the fill 
operation temporarily required them to move their trucks, plaintiffs parked their trucks on the 
neighboring Fleming property. 
20. The plaintiffs' use of the property to park trucks was consistent with other property 
uses in the area. Use of the property in the area for commercial and industrial purposes has changed 
very little over the years. 
21. In the early part of 1992, Woods Cross City adopted a new zoning ordinance which 
changed the zoning on plaintiffs' property and other property in the area to 1-1, light industrial. 
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22. On March 27, 1992, plaintiffs received a letter from Woods Cross City informing 
plaintiffs for the first time that the use of their property for parking trucks was in violation of the new 
zoning ordinance. The letter gave plaintiffs until April 20, 1992 to cease and desist. Plaintiffs 
refused to comply with the order, and after numerous demands over the years, defendant's attorney 
sent a letter to plaintiffs on November 13, 1997. The letter stated that if plaintiffs did not comply 
within 14 days, court action would be initiated to force compliance. 
23. As a result of that letter this action was filed by the plaintiffs and this trial ensued. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following conclusions of law. 
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court finds that the plaintiffs have established the elements for zoning estoppel 
set forth in Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980). 
2. The Court finds that Mr. Stephens' actions in first requiring and then issuing a fill 
permit to plaintiffs, knowing full well the use to which the property was being put and would be put 
in the future, without telling plaintiffs that there was any problem with that use, or noting the same 
on the fill permit, constitute a negligent omission by one who had a duty to act. Mr. Stephens' 
omission was not mere silence or inaction, as may have been the case in Young. He had personal 
knowledge of the use of the property, a use which had never been questioned by defendant, and a use 
which could reasonably be allowed under the then current zoning ordinance. If he had questions or 
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believed that use to be improper, then was the time to speak, not after plaintiffs had expended 
substantial resources. 
3. The Court also concludes that there is evidence only of good faith on the part of the 
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had no knowledge that there was even a potential problem with their land use 
until defendant informed them of the zoning change after significant resources had already been 
committed to the fill project. The Court also rules that the expenses, with a value greater than 
$100,000, outlaid by plaintiffs in such reliance were "extensive." 
4. The court also finds that plaintiffs inquired and consulted zoning authorities and 
reviewed zoning ordinances regarding use of the property. Ms. Hugoe went to defendant's offices 
and reviewed the local zoning ordinance before purchasing the property. The specific language of 
the zoning ordinance itself caused her to reasonably believe that the use, a use to which the property 
had been put by the prior owners, would be allowed. Knowing that the prior owners, as well as the 
surrounding property owners, used their identically zoned property in the same or similar manner, 
with defendant's longstanding acquiescence, a review of the ordinance must have seemed nothing 
more than a formality to plaintiffs. 
5. The Court cannot envision how, under the facts of this case, plaintiffs would have had 
a further duty to "inquire and confer" with the local zoning authority to be sure they could use the 
property the same way it had been historically used and the same way surrounding property owners 
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used their property, especially in light of the zoning ordinance's seemingly express approval of such 
use. 
6. The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs have met the elements required by Young to 
estop defendant from arguing in this action (or any criminal or administrative action) that plaintiffs' 
use of their property was not legally conforming to the prior zoning ordinance. 
7. The Court finds that plaintiffs have met the requirements to establish a valid pre-
existing nonconforming use. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-103(k) states: 
(k) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that: 
(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation; 
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation 
governing the land changed; and 
(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with the zoning 
regulations that now govern the land. 
8. The Court's conclusion that the use legally existed before the current zoning is set 
forth in the prior section. As an independent, but interrelated, grounds for finding the first element 
required for a non-conforming use, the Court sets forth the following: Under the zoning ordinances 
in effect at the time plaintiffs purchased their property and began their current use, the property was 
zoned "C-2." Permitted uses under C-2 include "transfer company." It is the Court's ruling that 
Hugoe Trucking is a "transfer company" within the meaning of defendant's prior zoning ordinance 
and that Hugoe Trucking's use of the property was and is consistent with this designation. 
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9. It has not been argued by the parties, and is thus apparently not at issue, but the Court 
also finds that the use of the property was "maintained continuously since the time the zoning 
regulation governing the land changed." There was a period of time when plaintiffs trucks were 
parked off-site to enable the filling and grading process, yet such would not constitute a 
"discontinuance." Therefore, to the extent that it is at issue, the Court rules that plaintiffs' use was 
"maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation governing the land changed." 
10. The third element is not disputed by the parties. Therefore, the Court would find that 
plaintiffs' current, and past, use of their property to park trucks in conjunction with their trucking 
business is a legal, non-conforming use. 
III. JUDGMENT 
The Court hereby enters judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The Court rules that plaintiffs fall 
within the definition of a "transfer company" under the C-2 zoning in effect at the time plaintiffs 
purchased the property. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to continue to use their property in a manner 
consistent with this designation, including storing and parking trucks in conjunction with plaintiffs' 
business. The Court permanently enjoins defendant from taking any action to prohibit or prevent 
plaintiffs from using the property in this manner. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover costs pursuant to 
applicable court rules. 
10 
•r&' 
DATED this J E ^ day of QM<U/&, , 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
Hc£(LiM J- -bL 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this J1* [ day of July, 1998,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be mailed through United 
States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Michael Z. Hayes 
Todd J. Godfrey 
Mazuran & Hayes 
2118 East 3900 South, Suite B300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
W \5000\5145\0004\bhbFindingsConclusionsPld wpd 
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Gregory M. Simonsen (#4669) 
Clark B. Fetzer (#1069) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAMON HUGOE, DEBBIE HUGOE, and 




WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal 
corporation and political subdivision of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiffs, Damon Hugoe, Debbie Hugoe and Hugoe Trucking, Inc , hereby complain and 
allege of defendant Woods Cross City as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiffs Damon Hugoe and Debbie Hugoe are husband and wife, residing in West 
Bountiful, Davis County, Utah. 
U u u vJ i 
^ndc 
COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND 
DECLARATORY RELIEF 
C i v U N o / l ^ O ^ C V ' 
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2. Plaintiff Hugoe Trucking, Inc., is a Utah corporation, with its principal place of 
business in Woods Cross, Davis County, Utah. Hugoe Trucking, Inc., is owned by Damon Hugoe 
and Debbie Hugoe. Hugoe Trucking, Inc., is a small trucking company engaged in the business of 
transporting rock products and rock aggregates. 
3. Defendant Woods Cross City is a municipality incorporated under the laws of the 
State of Utah and as such is a political subdivision of the State of Utah. 
4. This court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to §§ 78-3-4 and 78-33-1 of the 
Utah Code. Venue is proper before this court pursuant to §§ 78-13-1 and 78-13-7 of the Utah Code. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. On or about June 12, 1991, Damon Hugoe and Debbie Hugoe purchased property 
located in Woods Cross City, Davis County, Utah, more fully described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet 
West and North 0°26' East 330 feet and West 235.8 feet from the 
Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet; thence South 670.14 
feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65 feet along said street; 
thence North 670.14 feet to the point of beginning. 
AND 
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet 
West and North 0°26' West and North 0°26' East 330 feet and West 
105.8 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet; 
thence South 670.14 feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65 
feet along said street; thence North 670.14 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
ALSO: 
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet 
West and North 0°26' East 330 feet and West 170.8 feet from the 
Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet; thence South 670.14 
feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65 feet along said street; 
thence North 670.14 feet to the point of beginning. 
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ALSO: 
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 660 feet 
West from the Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian; and running thence North 330 feet; 
thence West 72.8 feet; thence South 330 feet; thence East 72.8 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
6. Prior to the time the Hugoes purchased the subject property, it was used for an 
extended period for the storage of large mobile storage containers. Woods Cross City never 
challenged the property use under the prior owner. 
7. The Hugoes purchased the subject property for the primary purpose of having a place 
for their business, Hugoe Trucking, Inc., to park trucks after hours. 
8. When the Hugoes purchased the property, the property was zoned pursuant to 
Chapter 13 (Commercial Zone C-2) of the Woods Cross City ordinances. Permitted uses in the 
Commercial Zone C-2 included but were not limited to uses such as transfer companies, trailer sales, 
automobile sales and rental agencies, public garages (including automobile repair, and body and 
fender work and painting), police or fire stations, tire shops, and accessory uses and buildings 
customarily incidental to all such permitted uses. Conditional uses included parking lots incidental to 
authorized commercial uses, storage buildings and mini-warehouses, service stations and fuel sales 
offices, and trailer camps for trailers and mobile homes mounted on wheels for ready movement or 
transport. 
9. In August of 1991, the Hugoes applied for a construction permit from Woods Cross 
City. The permit was to bring fill onto the property, to level the property to enable the Hugoes to 
park their trucks on the property. At the time the Hugoes applied for the permit, Woods Cross City 
clearly knew and understood that the purpose of the fill permit was to level the property so that 
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Hugoe Trucking, Inc., could park its trucks on the property and use it as a yard for their trucking 
operations. With full knowledge of the intended purpose for the fill, on August 14, 1991, Woods 
Cross City issued construction permit no 1207 permitting Hugoe to improve its property for the 
parking of its trucks. 
10. Relying upon the zoning ordinance and upon the fill permit, Hugoe Trucking invested 
significant sums of money in the subject property to make it suitable for parking trucks. Hugoe 
Trucking has used the subject property continuously for parking its trucks since the issuance of the fill 
permit in August of 1991. 
11. In 1992, Woods Cross City enacted changes to its zoning ordinances Among the 
changes, Woods Cross changed the zoning of the area where the Hugoes owned their property to 
Zone I-l. The new I-l zoning appears to prohibit the Hugoes from using the property to park trucks 
and related equipment. 
12. From the time of the enactment of the new zoning ordinance until August of 1995, 
Hugoe Trucking continued to use the subject property for parking its trucks. In August of 1995, the 
City of Woods Cross issued a criminal information against Hugoe Trucking and Debbie Hugoe as its 
agent for violation of the new Woods Cross Zoning ordinance. The City claims that plaintiffs have 
committed a Class B misdemeanor by parking their equipment on the property. A true and correct 
copy of the information is attached hereto as exhibit "A". 
13. The purpose .of the City's action is not only to punish Hugoe Trucking and Debbie 
Hugoe for an alleged criminal violation but also for the purpose of compelling Hugoe Trucking to no 
longer park its trucks upon the property. A trial on the misdemeanor charge is scheduled for January 
2, 1997, at 6:30 p.m., before the Woods Cross City Justice Court. 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Relief) 
14. The allegations of the previous paragraphs are hereby incorporated in this cause of 
action. 
15. Pursuant to Utah case law and statutes, including but not limited to § 10-9-408 of the 
Utah Code and §§ 12-22-102 and 12-22-103 of the Woods Cross City ordinances, the plaintiffs have 
a vested right in a non-conforming use upon the subject property. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are 
entitled to continue to use their property for the purpose of parking trucks and equipment incidental 
thereto and for all other purposes that were proper prior to the zoning change. 
16. A prosecution and conviction under the new zoning ordinances would force the 
plaintiffs to stop parking its trucks on the property. Such a prosecution and conviction would 
constitute an unconstitutional taking of the property-in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
amendments of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
17. This Court should issue a declaratory judgment that the subject property carries with it 
a vested right to carry on the non-conforming use notwithstanding the 1992 zoning change and 
notwithstanding the efforts of Woods Cross City to criminally prosecute the plaintiffs for violation of 
the new zoning ordinance. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Injunctive Relief) 
18. The allegations of the previous paragraphs are hereby incorporated in this cause of 
action. 
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19. The plaintiffs, and each of them, will be seriously and irreparably harmed if Woods 
Cross City is allowed to go forward with its criminal prosecution for violation of the current zoning 
ordinance. The serious and irreparable harm that would come to the plaintiffs outweighs any benefit 
that Woods Cross City would obtain in stopping the plaintiffs from parking their trucks on the subject 
property during the pendency of this action. 
20. If Woods Cross City is allowed to go forward with the criminal prosecution for 
violation of the new zoning ordinance, plaintiffs will be compelled to close their business, inasmuch as 
they have no other facility to park their trucks and to dispatch their trucks. The plaintiffs will suffer 
further irreparable damage inasmuch as they will be unable to fulfill existing contracts with third 
parties. Overall, it is likely that the plaintiffs would be forced to close, never again to be reopened. 
21. This Court should first issue a preliminary injunction, preventing the criminal 
prosecution of the plaintiffs under the new zoning ordinance during the pendency of this action. Such 
an injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. At the trial of this case, this Court should 
issue a permanent injunction preventing the City from prosecuting the plaintiffs under the new zoning 
ordinance. The City should be further enjoined from in any way inhibiting the plaintiffs from parking 
their trucks or related equipment on the subject property. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the Court grant equitable relief as follows: 
1. A declaratory judgment that the plaintiffs have a vested right to a non-conforming use on 
the subject property to continue to use the property for parking trucks and other equipment 
associated with the business. 
2. The court should issue a preliminary and then permanent injunction preventing Woods 
Cross City from prosecuting the plaintiffs under the new zoning ordinance, or in any way preventing 
6 
the plaintiffs from the lawful use of their property in parking trucks and other vehicles associated with 
the business. 
3. For such other and further equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper 
DATED this 31 day of December, 1996. 




COMMERCIAL ZONE C-2 
Il4l2yi: Use Regulations 
11-13-2: Special Provisions 
11-13-3: Area and Frontage Regulations 
11-13-4: Yard Regulations 
11-13-5: Height Regulations 
11-13-6: Coverage Regulations 
11-13-7: Fencing 
11-13-8: Bond 
11-13-1: USB REGULATIONS. In Commercial Zone C-2, no building or land shall 
be used, and no building shall be erected which is arranged, intended or 
designed to be used for other than one or more of the following uses: 
(A) PERMITTED USES. 
(1) Any permitted use allowed in Commercial Zone C-l. 
(2) Apartment hotel; apartment motel. 
^^3) Automobile and trailer sales. 
^11^(4) Awning sales and repair. 
(5) Automobile rental agency. 
(6) Baths. 
(7) Bird store. 
(8) Blueprinting or photostating. 
(9) Bus depot. 
(10) Business college or private school operated as a 
commercial enterprise. 
(11) Cleaning establishment. 
(12) Department store. 
(13) Dressmaking shop for retail sales at said shop. 
(14) Electrical and heating equipment. 
(15) Employment agency. 
(16) Film exchange. 
(17) Fix-it shop. 
(18) Flooring or floor repair shop. 
(19) Fur sales, storage and/or repair. 
(20) Furniture store. 
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Greenhouse and/or nursery; plant materials, soil and lawn 
service, provided that all incidental equipment and 
supplies, including fertilizer and empty cans, etc. are 
kept within a building. 
Hospitals (except animal) or sanitariums. 
Hotel. , 
Ice storage, and retail and wholesale ice stores. 
Laundry. 
Lodge. 
Manufacture of goods to be sold at retail on the premises. 
Medical or dental laboratories. 
Music conservatory; music instruction. 
Mortuary. 
Pet shop or taxidermist. 
Plumbing or sheet metal supply shop if conducted wholly 
within a completely enclosed building. 
Printing, lithography or publishing. 
Public garage, including automobile repairing and 
incidental body and fender work, painting and upholstering 
if all operations are conducted wholly within a completely 
enclosed building. 
(35) Police or fire station. 
(36) Public services, excepting electric distributing station. 
(37) Rescue mission. 
(38) Retail stores or businesses. 
(39) Second hand store, if conducted wholly within a completely 
enclosed building. 
(40) Sign manufacturing shops, including neon, if conducted 
wholly within a completely enclosed building. 
(41) Studios (except motion picture). 
(42) Telephone exchange. 
(43) Tire shop operated wholly within a building. 
J(44) Travel bureau. (45) Transfer company. 
(46) Upholstering shop, if conducted wholly within a completely 
enclosed building. 
(47) Wedding chapel. 
(48) Wholesale merchandise broker, excluding wholesale storage. 
(49) Accessory uses and buildings customarily incidental to the 
above. 
(B) CONDITIONAL USES.: 
(1) Any conditional use permitted in Commercial Zone C-l. 
(2) Amusement enterprises, including a billiard or pool hall, 
bowling alley, dance hall, or theater auditorium. 
(3) Boxing arena. 
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(5) Circus or amusement enterprise of similar type, transient 
in character. 
(6) Electric substation. 
(7) Games of skill and science. 
(8) Monument works, retail. 
Penny «rcade. ____^  
tO}JPlaDDJPg '^jj srcd cabinet shopT> 
[Tl)Pony riding~ring, without stables. 
(12) Shooting gallery. 
(13) Small animal hospital. 
(14) Storage building for household goods and equipment; 
mini-warehouses. 
(15) Taverns; night clubs; beer parlors. 
(16) Temporary revival church. 
(17) Trade school, if not objectionable due to noise, odor, 
vibration, etc. 
(18.) Trailer camps for trailers and mobile homes mounted on 
wheels for ready movement or transport. 
(191) Veterinary. 
11-13-2 SPECIAL PROVISIONS. The above specified stores, shops or businesses 
shall be retail establishments and shall be permitted only under the following 
conditions: 
(A) Such businesses shall be conducted wholly within an enclosed 4r 
building, or on a lot which is enclosed by a solid wall, board 
fence or evergreen hedge not less than 6 feet in height, except 
for the sale of gasoline and oil by service stations, the 
parking of automobiles, and service to persons in automobiles. 
(B) All products produced, whether primary or incidental, shall be 
sold at retail on the premises; and no entertainment, except 
music, shall be permitted in cafes, confectioneries, or 
refreshment stands-
(C) Any exterior sign display shall pertain only to a use conducted 
within the building or lot or shall appertain to the lease or 
the sale of the property; such sign shall be attached flat 
against the wall of the building parallel to its horizontal 
dimension and shall not exceed 100 square feet in area. One 
such sign only may be permitted on each wall facing on a 
street.. In no case shall nay such sign employ animation or 
flashing lights and shall not project above the height of the 
building more than 36 inches. 
11-13-3: AREA AND FRONTAGE REGULATIONS. None, except off-street parking, 
loading, and unloading spaces, in accordance with Chapter 19, Title XI, of 
these Revised Ordinances. 
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11-13-4 YARD REGULATIONS. 
(A) Side Yards. For main buildings other than dwellings, none 
except that wherever a building is built upon a lot adjacent to 
a residential or agricultural zone boundary, there shall be 
provided a side yard of not less than 10 feet on the side of 
the building adjacent to the boundary line, and on corner lots 
the side yard which faces on the street shall be not less than 
30 feet. Accessory dwelling units where windows of such 
dwelling are provided adjacent to any side lot line, such 
dwellings shall be provided with a side yard of not less than 
10 feet. 
(B) Front Yard. The minimum depth of the front yard for all 
buildings shall be not less than 20 feet; provided, however, 
that the Planning Commission, as a Conditional Use and after 
consideration of the location of the proposed building, the 
shape and size of the lot or area upon which said building 
would be located, the uses being made of adjoining and nearby 
properties and the building setback thereon, the landscaping 
desired thereon, and such other conditions, elements and 
circumstances as the Planning Commission shall consider 
appropriate and relevant, may approve a lesser setback not to 
exceed a variance of more than 50 percent from the setback 
distance herein set forth. The Planning Commission may also 
approve an awning, canopy, porch or other structure attached to 
any such building in the front yard thereof extending to a 
point, including roof overhang, not closer than one foot from 
the street line, subject to the considerations herein mentioned 
and to the further consideration that prior to approval, the 
Planning Commission shall determine that the proposed awning, 
canopy, porch or other attachment to such building shall not 
unreasonably restrict visibility or sight clearance across the 
major portion of the front yard required by this Section or as 
otherwise modified by the Planning Commission in accordance 
with the provisions and requirements hereof. All billboards 
and other signs having less than 10 feet clearance between the 
ground and sign shall be required to have the same front yard 
as is required of buildings and other structures. 
(C) Rear Yard. The minimum rear yard for all buildings shall be 15* 
feet. ^^ 
11-13-5 HEIGHT REGULATIONS. The maximum permitted height of buildings shall 
not exceed two and one-half stories of 35 feet, provided that the Planning 
Commission, as a Conditional Use and after consideration of the location of the 
proposed building, the plans for incorporation of an approved fire protection 
•Amended 11-13-4(B) - Ordinance #231 4/6/82 
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sprinkling system therein, the shape and size of the lot or area upon which 
said building would be located, the uses being made of adjoining and nearby 
properties and such other conditions, elements and circumstances as the 
Planning Commission shall consider appropriate and relevant, may allow a 
greater height or greater number of stories in said building. 
11-13-6: COVERAGE REGULATIONS, No building or structure or group of 
buildings, with their accessory buildings, shall cover more than 60 percent of 
the area of the lot. 
11-13-7 FENCING. On lots containing mainbuild^ags other than single-family 
dwellings fences may-i>e-j^quired along the sjjdfeand/or rear lot lines by the 
Planning Commission. Howevfei%for topo^pa^hical, architectural, structures or 
other reasons, fencing may be watvcrf^n whole or in part. Where fences are 
required by the Planning CooBissipxiTthe^shall be either the solid or open 
mesh type with a minimum heighjKof 4 feetand^a maximum height of 6 feet. 
Fences along the side lot Lilies shall extend fro&K^ny required front yard 
setback to the rear of tt*e lot, but fences may be constructed along the side 
lot lines in the fronj^yard not to exceed 2 feet in height if the solid type or 
4 feet if the open^mesh type. 
11-13-8: BOND. A corporate surety or cash bond, or letter of credit from a 
land title company licensed to do business in the State of Utah, or from a 
bank, savings and loan association or other financially responsible lending 
institution, in an amount equal to 2 percent of the construction costs of each 
and every principal building constructed on the lot, other than a single-family 
dwelling, shall be required to guarantee the completion of all site 
development, including, among other things, the landscaping, sprinkling 
systems, driveways, parking areas, sidewalks and curb and gutter; provided, 
however, that the City Council, after recommendation by the Planning 
Commission, may accept other security sufficient to guarantee such 
installation. 
T-ll Ch-13 Page 5 Printed: 07/30/1986 
l l - 1 8 - 8 h a l FIWCIliG/HBGraAIIoisl 
h e i ^ t /ar^teqiii^ed &y\*he Pla 
height, i>r W Badge/br tMcJt gah 
exceed kix feetVinvheight; nab-
behind the/frontUrabd secbackV 
^p-oifth ofzshnd>s7or tfcees\shal\ 







jc0s , $H£D as\ tenors cotir 
,, sideL^lir reap 
ithority^LiL in Jhfs 








:s t^MT cir^ pat 5.0^  
ds, irty B^aSpprj: 
p±pion\ JAfey d^notvj 
inane 
11-18-9: SITE PLAN* *n Qny commercial or manufacturing zone, and in all 
zones where construction of main buildings or dwellings other than 
single-family dwellings is proposed or involved, the location of main and 
accessory buildings $on the site and in relation to one another, the traffic 
circulation features within the site, the height and bulk of buildings, the 
provision for off-street parking space, the provision for driveways for ingress 
and egress, and for the installation of curb, gutter and/or sidewalk when not 
already in place along the street bordering, and provision for other open space 
on the site, and the display of signs shall be in accordance with a site plan 
or plans or subsequent amendment thereof, approved in any case by the Planning 
Commission prior to issuance of a Building or Land-Use Permit. In approving 
site plans the Planning Commission may act on a site plan submitted to it or 
may act on its own initiative in proposing and approving a site plan, including 
any conditions or requirements designated or specified on or in connection 
therewith. A site plan shall include landscaping, fences, and walls designed 
to further the purposes of the regulations for commercial, industrial, and 
residential zones with two or more family dwelling units and such features 
shall be provided and maintained as a condition of the establishment and 
maintenance of any use to which they are appurtenan&2* In considering any site 
plan hereunder the Planning Commission shall endeavor to assure safety and 
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convenience of traffic movements both within the area covered and in relation 
to access streets, harmonious and beneficial relation among the buildings and 
uses in the area covered, and satisfactory and harmonious relation between such 
area and contiguous land and buildings and adjacent neighborhoods. 
All persons required to file a site plan under the provisions of this Section 
shall, at the time of the filing thereof, pay to the City a fee of $10.00 per 
acre, or any portion thereof, contained within the area covered by the site 
plan, with a minimum fee of $25.00, the same to cover part of the cost of 
processing and reviewing said site plan; provided, however, that said fee may 
be changed from time to time by Resolution of the City Council. 
•Amended 11-18-9 - Ordinance #257 8/21/84 
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